Comparative reflections upon the Assisted Dying Bill 2013: a plea for a more European approach by Halliday, S
promoting access to White Rose research papers
White Rose Research Online
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
Universities of Leeds, Sheffield and York
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
This is the author’s post-print version of an article to be published in Medical
Law International, 13 (2)
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/id/eprint/76573
Published article:
Halliday, S (2013) Comparative reflections upon the Assisted Dying Bill 2013: a
plea for a more European approach. Medical Law International, 13 (2). ISSN
0968-5332 (In Press)
http://mli.sagepub.com/
1 
 
Samantha Halliday 
Comparative reflections upon the Assisted Dying Bill 2013: a plea for a more European 
approach  
 
 ‘It will generally be found that, as soon as the terrors of life reach the point at which they 
outweigh the terrors of death, a man will put an end to his life.’  
Arthur Schopenhauer1 
Introduction 
The 21st century has witnessed a trend towards legislating to permit assisted dying in the 
United States of America and within Europe, although the scope of the legislation and 
regulatory models adopted vary considerably between the two continents.  Thus physician 
assisted suicide is regulated by statute in Oregon (Death With Dignity Act 1997), Washington 
(Death With Dignity Act 2008) and Vermont (Patient Choice and Control at End of Life Act, 
2013), whilst active voluntary euthanasia and physician assisted suicide are regulated by 
statute in the Netherlands (Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review 
Procedures) Act, 2001) Belgium (Law Relating to Euthanasia, 2002)2 and Luxemburg (Law 
of 16 March 2009 on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 2009).3  In England and Wales 
                                                            
1 Arthur Schopenhauer ‘On suicide,’ in Studies in Pessimism, trans T. Bailey Saunders Nework: Cosimo, 2007, 
at 28.   
2 Although Art. 2 Belgian Act defines euthanasia as ‘the act, performed by a third party, which intentionally 
ends the life of a person at his or her the request,’ a definition that clearly excludes assisted suicide, the Belgian 
FCCE has taken the view that the Belgian Act applies to PAS as well as euthanasia, reasoning that the Act does 
not say how euthanasia should occur. Federale Controle – en Evaluatiecommissie Euthanasie Eerste Verslag 
Aan de Wetgevende Kamers 22 september 2002 - 31 december 2003 [First report of the Federal Commission of 
Evaluation and Control Committee], 2004,  at 24. 
3 In Switzerland Art. 114 Penal Code prohibits AVE, but assisting suicide does not constitute a crime unless the 
assistance is rendered for a selfish reason, Art.115 Penal Code. This article will not consider the practice of 
assisted suicide in Switzerland as it is practiced in a legal vacuum without effective regulatory control. 
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assisted dying4 remains topical, not least due to the steady stream of cases considered by the 
courts where individuals have sought to challenge the absolute prohibition of assistance that 
currently applies.5  The courts have long recognised the need for Parliament to consider end-
of-life decision-making, consistently noting that any repeal of the prohibition must be 
undertaken by the legislature rather than by judicial creativity.6 Nevertheless, a number of 
courts and committees have concluded that legalisation should not occur,  a recommendation 
based not only on a concern to uphold the sanctity of life, but also due to the perception thatit 
would simply not be possible to legalise assisted dying whilst incorporating sufficient 
safeguards within the legislation to protect the vulnerable.7 The latest Bill to seek to legalise 
assisted dying in England and Wales is Lord Falconer’s Assisted Dying Bill 2013, a Private 
Member’s Bill designed to legalise physician assisted suicide (PAS) for the terminally ill.8     
This article assesses the validity of the argument that the inherent problems of legalisation are 
insurmountable by evaluating the safeguards incorporated into the Assisted Dying Bill 2013 
and reflecting upon the experience of the statutory regulation of assisted dying in three other 
jurisdictions: the Netherlands and Belgium, representing the European model of regulation, 
and Oregon, illustrating the American approach to regulating assisted dying.9  Part one of this 
                                                            
4 Assisted dying is used in varying contexts to refer to only PAS (as in the case of the Assisted Dying Bill 2013), 
or to encompass both PAS and AVE.  Throughout this article reference to assisted dying should be taken to 
include either or both forms of assistance, unless otherwise indicated.  As discussed below, the form taken by 
assistance is of little import see below at 000. 
5 See for example R (Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2002] 1 AC 800;  Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 
1; R (Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] UKHL 45, [2010] AC 345; Nicklinson v Ministry of 
Justice [2012] HRLR. 16, [2012] EWHC 304 (QB), R (Nicklinson and another) v Ministry of Justice  R (AM) v 
Director of Public Prosecutions [2013] EWCA Civ 961;  [2013] WLR (D)  326. 
6 See for example Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, [1993] A.C. 789, per Lord Mustill at 891, Pretty n.5 per Lord 
Steyn at 834, per Lord Hobhouse at 852, R v Inglis [2010] EWCA Crim 2637, [2011] 1 WLR 1110, per Lord 
Judge CJ at [39], Nicklinson n.5, per Toulson LJ at [74ff.] (QB), and Lord Dyson MR and Elias LJ at [60] (CA). 
7 See for example House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, HL paper 21 (1993-4), hereinafter HL 
SC 1993; New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, When Death is Sought: Assisted Suicide and 
Euthanasia in the Medical Context (New York, NYSTF, 1994) ix; Washington v Glucksburg 521 US 702, per 
Rehnquist CJ at 731–2 (1997). 
8 The first reading of the Assisted Dying Bill 2013 took place on 15 May 2013.  At the time of writing, the 
second reading has not yet been scheduled.  
9 Space precludes a detailed consideration of each of the jurisdictions, however the Vermont and Washington 
Acts are closely modelled on the Oregon DWDA and the Luxemburg Act is heavily derived from the Belgian 
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article briefly outlines the context within which end-of-life decision-making takes place and 
considers the way in which the principle of dignity has been asserted by both proponents and 
opponents of legalisation.  Thus it may be asserted to demand that a person has a right to die 
with dignity, where dignity is constructed as entailing a choice to die with medical assistance.  
Alternatively it may require that the prohibition of assisted dying be maintained in order to 
ensure the dignity of the person, regardless of whether that person is disabled or terminally 
ill.  Thereafter, part two outlines the regulatory schemes adopted to permit assisted dying in 
other jurisdictions before critically considering the provisions of the Assisted Dying Bill 
2013, assessing the key substantive and procedural safeguards set out therein and comparing 
them to those set out in the European and American Acts.   
Any legislation enacted must attain a balance between instituting a rigorous system of control 
mechanisms to ensure compliance and accountability, whilst simultaneously ensuring that the 
safeguards and procedures do not become so onerous as to defeat the objective of the 
legislation, to enable the provision of assisted dying in qualifying cases.  In seeking to 
achieve this balance it is argued that we can learn much from the experiences of other 
jurisdictions, both in terms of what safeguards have been demonstrated to ensure quality and 
accountability in decision-making, whilst also identifying those which appear to serve no 
useful purpose. It would however be a misconception to believe that laws can simply be 
transplanted from one jurisdiction to another, although arguably that is what the Assisted 
Dying Bill 2013 attempts to do, taking the Oregon Death with Dignity Act and seeking to 
import it almost wholesale into the very different legal, social and cultural context that exists 
in England and Wales.  Significant differences exist between the way in which end-of-life 
care, and health care in general, are provided, not least the fact that Oregon, along with the 
rest of the USA, does not offer universal healthcare.  Therefore, it is suggested that policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Act, with the only significant difference being that it makes no provision for a minor to request assistance in 
dying. 
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makers in England and Wales should give much greater consideration to the European model 
of regulation which operates in a social and political context much closer to our own.   
It will be concluded that it is possible to construct legislation authorising assisted dying in 
strictly controlled circumstances, without undermining the prohibition of intentional killing, 
described by the Walton Committee as ‘the cornerstone of law and social relationships.’10 
Moreover, it will be argued that far from exposing the vulnerable to the risk of abuse, such 
regulation would provide much greater protection of all lives than the current law that ensures 
end-of-life decision-making takes place in a twilight zone of obfuscation, where foreseeable 
consequences are divorced from intention and resort is made to dubious distinctions drawn 
between acts and omissions, without any safeguards designed to ensure patient safety or 
medical accountability. 
I The context of end-of-life decision-making and the construction of dignity 
A The context 
In the majority of cases death is now medically managed, that is death has been medicalised 
to the extent that when, where and how we die is increasingly a medical decision.  Each of 
the jurisdictions recognise that a patient with capacity has the right to refuse medical 
treatment, even life-sustaining treatment, contemporaneously or in advance through an 
advance decision/directive11 and that doctors acting in contravention of that refusal will 
commit a trespass to the person.12 Absent such a treatment refusal, the courts in each 
jurisdiction have recognised that doctors may lawfully withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
                                                            
10HL SC 1993, n. 7. at para.237. 
11 In Re T. (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1993] Fam. 95, per Lord Donaldson MR at 102; Bland, n.6, per Lord 
Keith at 857; St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v S  [1998] 3 All ER 673, per Judge LJ at 685;  Re MB 
(Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FLR 426, per Butler-Sloss LJ at 432; s.24 Mental Capacity Act; Article 450 
Dutch Civil Code; Article 8 §4 Belgian Law Relating to the Rights of the Patient, 2002; Cruzan v Director, 
Missouri Department of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
12 In Re T. n.11, per Lord Donaldson MR at 102; Bland n.6, per Lord Mustill at 891; B v An NHS Hospital Trust 
[2002] 2 All E.R. 449; Cruzan n.11 
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medical treatment, such non-treatment decisions being classified as legally innocuous 
omissions, rather than active intervention to terminate life.  Moreover, a non-treatment 
decision (to withhold artificial nutrition and hydration) may be combined with sedation until 
death occurs, a procedure variously termed terminal sedation, or palliative sedation. 
Similarly, the courts have accepted the dubious construction of intention afforded by the 
doctrine of double effect, whereby a doctor may administer pain-relieving medication with 
the intention of alleviating pain, despite recognising that it is also likely to hasten the 
patient’s death.13 The tenability of the doctrine has been wholly undermined by both the 
House of Lords’ decision in R v Woollin14 that conflated foresight with intention and by 
increased knowledge about the functioning of opioids.  Clinical evidence demonstrates that 
‘reasonable’ use of opioids will not hasten death,15 instead a very large increase in the 
dosage, larger than could possibly be thought necessary to relieve pain, will be required to 
achieve that effect, something that will not be compatible with an intention to merely relieve 
pain. 
The spurious nature of the difference between actively causing death and merely omitting to 
treat, together with the dubious nature of the doctrine of double effect, have undoubtedly left 
the law ‘morally and intellectually misshapen.’16 Nevertheless, English law maintains its 
absolute prohibition of intentional killing, categorising the active termination of life at the 
patient’s request as murder.  In contrast, both the Dutch and the Belgian Parliaments enacted 
legislation more than a decade ago allowing doctors to perform active voluntary euthanasia 
                                                            
13 Bland  n. 6, per Lord Goff at 868; Re J (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment) [1991] Fam 33, per Lord 
Donaldson at 46; R v Adams H. Palmer, ‘Dr Adams’ Trial for Murder’ [1957] Crim LR 365, per Devlin J. 
14 [1999] 1 AC 82, at 93, per Lord Steyn. 
15 See for example D. Azoulay et al. “Opioids, survival, and advanced cancer in the hospice setting” (2011) 12 
Journal of the American Medical Directors Association 129, RK Portenoy et al. “Opioid use and survival at the 
end of life: a survey of a hospice population.” (2006) 32 Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 532, B. 
Estfan et al. “Respiratory function during parenteral opioid titration for cancer pain.” (2007) 21 Palliative 
Medicine 81. 
16 Bland, n. 6,at 887. 
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(AVE) in certain circumstances without incurring criminal liability.  Moreover, whilst 
legislation enabling doctors to assist suicide has been enacted in the Netherlands and 
Oregon,17 in England and Wales such assistance is prohibited by s.2 Suicide Act 1961.  
Prosecutions under s.2 may only be instituted with the consent of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, but the guidance issued in the wake of the House of Lords’ decision in R 
(Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions18 suggests that ‘professional’ assisted suicide will 
not be tolerated, listing the fact that ‘the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a medical 
doctor, nurse, other healthcare professional [or] a professional carer’ as a public interest 
factor in favour of prosecution.19 Requiring the DPP to give guidance as to the relative 
weighting of this factor, the majority of the Court of Appeal recently recognised that as it 
currently stands the guidance does not enable a healthcare professional to foresee to a 
reasonable degree the consequences of providing assistance, thus breaching Art. 8(2) 
ECHR.20  The policy does not indicate whether the fact that the assistor was acting in her 
capacity as a healthcare professional might be outweighed by factors identified as tending 
against prosecution, including for example that the patient ‘had reached a voluntary, clear, 
settled and informed decision to commit suicide’ (para.45(1)); the assistor ‘was wholly 
motivated by compassion’ (para.45(2)); and that she reported the assisted suicide  to the 
police and fully assisted them in their enquiries (para.45(6)).  The DPP has sought leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court, but any clarification ultimately issued may be that the fact that 
assistance was provided by a healthcare professional is the overriding consideration, further 
deterring healthcare professionals from openly assisting suicide.   
                                                            
17 The FCCE has concluded that the Belgian Act does apply to PAS, notwithstanding the fact that it refers only 
to euthanasia (Art. 2), n.2.   
18N.5. 
19 DPP, Policy for Prosecutors in respect of Cases of Assisted Suicide, 2010, para. 43(14), available at 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy.pdf. 
20 Nicklinson n.5 at [140]. 
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It is submitted that prosecutorial policy is a blunt and inappropriate tool for regulating 
assisted dying, a task that should be left to the legislature.    In a small number of cases 
doctors assist their patients to commit suicide or actively terminate patients’ lives, in some 
cases without a request from the patient.  Significantly, studies demonstrate that this final 
category of end-of-life decisions is not limited to jurisdictions where assisted dying is legally 
permissible, with Clive Seale reporting that from 2007-8 0.21% of all deaths in England and 
Wales were cases of AVE. 21 The absolute prohibition of assisted dying means that end-of-
life decision-making takes place in the twilight zone; doctors undoubtedly do assist dying, but 
they do so in secret, without recourse to structures intended to support their decision-making, 
such as a second opinion, or to ensure that the assistance is rendered on the basis of the 
patient’s free and informed request. The time has come to address the issue, rather than to 
continue to allow the law and policy pertaining to end-of-life decision-making to continue to 
develop in a fragmented manner. 
B. The principle of dignity and assisted dying 
The concept of dignity has become increasingly important in discussions about death and the 
process of dying, as the European Court of Human Rights recognised, human dignity and 
human freedom form ‘the very essence of the Convention.’22  However, despite frequent 
reference to the notion in international instruments, there is no consensus upon what is meant 
by ‘dignity’ in this, or other medical contexts.23  Recognising that it can be used as both a 
sword and a shield, Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword offer two constructions of 
dignity, namely dignity as empowerment and dignity as constraint.24     
                                                            
21 C. Seale “End-of-life decisions in the UK involving medical practitioners” (2009) 23 Palliat Med 198. 
22 Pretty v UK n.5, at para 65. 
23 See, for example the multiple understandings of dignity adopted by contributors to ED Pellegrino et al (eds.), 
Human Dignity and Bioethics Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009.   
24 D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw, Oxford: OUP, 2001. 
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Conceptualising dignity as empowerment recognises the manner in which it can be used to 
support choice, to reinforce autonomy.  It is this construction of dignity that has been adopted 
by those seeking to promote assisted dying who use it as a more publicly acceptable synonym 
for autonomy.  Thus the right to die movement no longer campaign for ‘euthanasia’, or even 
‘assisted suicide’ preferring to talk of ‘dignity in dying’ or ‘assisted dying’, whilst 
emphasising that they are motivated by compassion and choice.  Both formulations are well 
demonstrated by the renaming of the main right to die organisations on both sides of the 
Atlantic - the British Voluntary Euthanasia Society renamed itself ‘Dignity in Dying’, whilst 
its American counterpart became ‘Compassion and Choices’. Similarly, the titles given to the 
American Acts  (the ‘Death with Dignity Acts’ of Oregon and Washington, and Vermont’s 
‘Patient Choice at End of Life Act’)  demonstrate the key role now attributed to dignity as a 
vehicle for choice, even though, as Susan Behuniak notes, none of the Acts make any attempt 
to define ‘dignity’.25 
The synthesis of dignity with autonomy can also be observed in the judicial consideration of 
end-of-life decision-making.  Thus, for example, in Cruzan, an American case concerning the 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from a woman in a persistent vegetative state,  
Justice Brennan (dissenting) held that Nancy Cruzan was ‘entitled to choose to die with 
dignity.’26 He reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that she was in a persistent 
vegetative state and thus incapable of formulating any choice other than that made by a third 
party on her behalf through the application of substituted judgement! Moreover, dignity as 
empowerment formed the basis of the successful challenge to Montana’s prohibition of 
assisted suicide in Baxter v. Montana (2009).27  Relying on article 2(4) Montana Constitution 
(‘The dignity of the human being is inviolable...’) Mr Baxter sought to use dignity to 
                                                            
25 S. Behuniak “’Death with ‘‘dignity’’: The wedge that divides the disability rights movement from the right to 
die movement’ (2011) 30(1) Politics and the Life Sciences 17, at 19. 
26 Cruzan n.11, at 257. 
27 224 P.3d 1211 (2009). 
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reinforce his claim to autonomy, to be able to decide for himself, together with his doctor, 
when the time had come to die.  In the District Court Judge McCarter concluded that:  
The right to personal autonomy included in the state constitutional right to privacy, 
and the right to determine ‘the most fundamental question of life’ inherent in the state 
right to dignity, mandate that a competent, terminally ill patient has the right to 
choose to end his or her life.28 
This construction of the concept of dignity, focussed upon personal choice, is consistent with 
that adopted by the US Supreme Court in its abortion jurisprudence.  Writing for the majority 
in Casey, Justice O’Connor expressed this notion in the following terms: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make 
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery 
of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.29 
Application of such a formulation of dignity, based upon autonomy and the construction of 
personhood through choices, requires that our death or dying reflects the choices we made 
about how to live, about what was important to us, and this construction was echoed in the 
approach taken by Lord Justice Hoffmann in Bland, where he stated that: 
It is demeaning to the human spirit to say that, being unconscious, he can have no 
interest in his personal privacy and dignity, in how he lives or dies. Anthony Bland 
therefore has a recognisable interest in the manner of his life and death which can 
                                                            
28 Baxter v Montana, December 5, 2008; 2008 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 482.  On appeal The Montana Supreme Court 
affirmed the District Court’s decision, but on other grounds. 
29 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania et al v Casey 505 US 833 (1992), at 851. 
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help the court to apply the principles of self- determination and the value of the 
individual.30  
In making this argument Lord Justice Hoffman relied on Ronald Dworkin’s distinction 
between critical and experiential interests, arguing that critical interests will survive 
incapacity, that our interest in the manner in which we live and die will survive even a 
persistent vegetative state.31 Thus this conception of dignity as empowerment seeks ‘to 
reinforce claims to self-determination rather than to limit free choice.’32  It is subjective and 
prioritises the values of the individual, rather than seeking to establish a universal human 
dignity.   
The construct of dignity as empowerment is clearly expressed in the reasons given for 
seeking assisted dying.  Those reasons demonstrate that pain is not the only, or even the 
principal, source of suffering, rather individuals seeking assistance are generally motivated 
by a desire to retain, or indeed regain control of their lives.  Thus in Oregon, the most 
common concern relating to end-of-life has consistently been reported as ‘losing autonomy’ 
(93.5% of PAS recipients), followed by being ‘less able to engage in activities making life 
enjoyable (92.2%) and loss of dignity (77.9%), contrasted with ‘inadequate pain control or 
concern about it’ (29.9%).33  As these reasons highlight, the availability of assisted dying 
may promote the individual’s dignity, empowering her to determine not only the timing, but 
also the manner of her death and reflecting Nietzsche’s proclamation: ‘I want to die proudly 
when it is no longer possible to live proudly’.34   
                                                            
30 Bland, n. 6, at 829. 
31 R. Dworkin Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (London: 
Harper Collins, 1993, 199ff. 
32 D. Beyleveld & R. Brownsword n.24, at 28. 
33 Oregon DWDA Annual Report 2012, at 5. 
34 F. Nietzsche “The Twilight of the Idols” in The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche (1909 – 11), vol. 16, 
at 88. 
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A subjective conceptualisation of dignity supports the position that individuals should be able 
to determine at what point their suffering becomes unbearable, to the extent that they wish to 
be assisted to die; it focuses upon the individual and the values she holds.  However, there are 
multiple understandings of dignity, and as Beyleveld and Brownsword recognise it can also 
be used to enforce paternalism, to protect the dignity of all humans by denying individual 
choice.  This concept of human dignity as constraint underlies much of the stated opposition 
to legalising assisted dying, namely that such a course would negatively impact upon the 
social perceptions of disability and would devalue the lives of the most vulnerable members 
of society, particularly the elderly, the sick and the disabled.  The Walton Committee 
recognised this danger, concluding that ‘the message which society sends to vulnerable and 
disadvantaged people should not, however obliquely, encourage them to seek death, but 
should assure them of our care and support in life.’35 
As Susan Behuniak has argued, ‘the debate over physician assisted death occurs within a 
cultural context that assumes the indignity of life with a disability.’36  Thus, the most vocal 
opponents to the legalisation of assisted dying have been disability rights campaigners, 
arguing that any step on the road to legalisation risks degrading the lives of the disabled, that 
the talk of ‘right to die’ might become a ‘duty to die’. 37  Using dignity as constraint, it is 
argued that the dignity of all people can only be protected if the absolute prohibition of 
intentional killing is maintained, that any step towards legalisation of assisted dying will be a 
step down the slippery slope to non-voluntary and even involuntary euthanasia.38   
                                                            
35 HL SC 1993, at para.239. 
36 S. Behuniak “’Death with ‘‘dignity’’: The wedge that divides the disability rights movement from the right to 
die movement’ (2011) 30(1) Politics and the Life Sciences 17, at 25. 
37 See for example Jane Campbell, ‘It’s My Life—It’s My Decision? Assisted Dying Versus Assisted Living’ in 
Luke Clements and Janet Read (eds), Disabled People and the Right to Life (Routledge, 2008) 85. 
38Space precludes a detailed consideration of the slippery slope argument in both its logical and empirical forms, 
suffice it to say that studies conducted in the Netherlands, Belgium and Oregon have found no evidence of a 
slippery slope.  For an excellent account of the slippery slope argument see S.W.Smith End-of-Life Decisions in 
Medical Care, Cambridge: CUP, 2012, chapter 13; S. W. Smith, ‘Fallacies of the Logical Slippery Slope in the 
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The evidence of those jurisdictions where assistance is lawfully available needs to be 
assessed in order to evaluate how credible a threat the legalisation of assisted dying poses to 
vulnerable groups.  Detailed studies have been conducted in the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Oregon; there is no evidence of a systemic risk to members of vulnerable groups.39  Indeed, 
as Margaret Battin noted ‘people who died with a physician’s assistance were more likely to 
be members of groups enjoying comparative social, economic, educational, professional and 
other privileges.’40  Similar findings have been reported by Judith Rietjens and Yanna Van 
Wesemael indicating that those belonging to vulnerable groups may suffer discrimination, 
finding it very difficult to access assistance in dying, rather than being coerced into 
requesting such assistance.41 
As Roger Brownsword recognises, the argument concerning the inability to protect the 
vulnerable is a ‘one-sided precautionary argument.’42  In framing safeguards it is important to 
take account of the constituents of that group which might be considered the most vulnerable 
in any debate about assisted dying – the disabled, and to involve constituents of this group in 
the framing of safeguards.  However, it is also important to note that whilst disability 
campaign groups tend to oppose the legalisation of assisted dying, the same is not necessarily 
true of disabled individuals,43 thus 75% of people with a disability surveyed for the British 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Debate on Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia’ (2005) 13 Medical Law Review 224; cf. J. Keown, 
Euthanasia, Ethics and Public Policy: an Argument Against Legalisation, Cambridge: CUP, 2002, chapter 7. 
39 See for example F. Norwood et al “Vulnerability and the ‘slippery slope’ at the end of life: a qualitative study 
of euthanasia, general practice and home death in the Netherlands” (2009) 26(6) Fam Pract 472; M. Battin et al 
“Legal physician-assisted dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: evidence concerning the impact on patients in 
‘vulnerable’ groups” (2007) 33 JME 591; Y. Van Wesemael et al., “Process and Outcomes of Euthanasia 
Requests under the Belgian Act on Euthanasia: A Nationwide Survey”, (2011) 42(5) J Pain Symptom 
Management 721, J.A.C. Rietjens et al “Medical end-of-life decisions: Does its use differ in vulnerable patient 
groups? A systematic review and meta-analysis” (2012) 74 Social Science & Medicine 1282   
40 M. Battin et al n 39, at 597. Cf I.G.Finlay & R.George “Legal physician-assisted suicide in Oregon and The 
Netherlands: evidence concerning the impact on patients in vulnerable groups – another perspective on 
Oregon’s data” (2011) 37 JME 171. 
41 Y. Van Wesemael et al., n 39; J.A.C. Rietjens et al n. 39. 
42 R. Brownsword et al “Prospective Legal Immunity and Assistance with Dying: Submission to the 
Commission on Assisted Dying” (2012) 23 KLJ 181, at 185. 
43 Pamela Fadem et al, ‘Attitudes of People with Disabilities towards Physician-Assisted Suicide Legislation: 
Broadening the Dialogue’ (2003) 28(6) Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 977; Charles E Drum et al, 
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Social Attitudes study in 2005 were found to support the legalisation of assisted dying,44 and 
all the legal challenges to the prohibition of assisted dying have involved profoundly disabled 
individuals seeking assistance in dying.45  Moreover, the fear that the vulnerable might feel 
obliged to take part in assisted suicide does not mean that this area should fall outside the 
regulatory landscape, rather it provides good reason to regulate and to ensure that a robust 
system of regulation can negate such coercion, to ensure that assessments of an individual’s 
quality of life are made by that individual herself and not by a third party.   
Thus it is suggested that this one-sided precautionary model fails to distinguish between 
instances where the disabled person’s autonomy is undermined  (when a third party makes a 
decision that for example she should not be resuscitated) and those where a disabled 
individual exercises autonomy, for example by choosing to refuse treatment or to request 
euthanasia.  It fails to recognise both the plurality of opinions within the various communities 
that could be considered vulnerable and that, as the evidence shows, members of those 
communities may find it more difficult, rather than less, to access assistance in dying. 
Susan Behuniak summarised the difference between the competing formulations of dignity in 
end-of-life decision-making as being that for proponents of assisted dying, dignity determines 
how one dies, whilst opponents fear the principle of dignity may be used to determine who 
should die.46  It is suggested that a more nuanced understanding of the concept may enable 
the recognition of both the personal and broader concepts of dignity in a system within which 
assisted dying is legal, through the creation of a robust framework of strong procedural and 
substantive safeguards.  The creation of such a framework would recognise the inherent value 
of all life and give effect to the state’s duty to protect life, but simultaneously recognise the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
‘The Oregon Death with Dignity Act: Results of a Literature Review and Naturalistic Inquiry’ (2010) 3 
Disability and Health Journal 3. 
44 E. Clery et al “Quickening Death: the Euthanasia Debate” in Park et al (eds)  British Social Attitudes: 2006 – 
2007,  The 23rd Report, London: Sage 2007.   
45 See for example the cases brought by Diane Pretty, Debbie Purdy and Tony Nicklinson, n.5. 
46 S. Behuniak n.36, at 28. 
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dignity of individuals in permitting them to choose to be assisted to die, subject to satisfying 
the safeguards designed to ensure that assistance is only provided in the case of a competent, 
free choice. Moreover, it will be argued that such a choice can only be made in the context of 
comprehensive social and palliative care, necessitating an investment in both.  
Whilst there is a need to protect the vulnerable, there is also a need to respect the right of 
everyone to choose for themselves what constitutes an acceptable quality of life.  Permitting 
an individual to choose to be assisted to die should not undermine respect for the disabled in 
general, indeed by creating strong and effective regulation of assisted dying the legislation 
should form a bulwark protecting all life, disabled or otherwise, against quality of life 
evaluations made by a third party, respecting the inherent dignity of all life. Diane Coleman, 
the president of Not Dead Yet, locates the group’s opposition to assisted dying in the 
experience of disabled people within the broader healthcare system arguing that  ‘As 
society’s proverbial ‘‘canaries’’ in the health care system, disability rights advocates are 
sounding the alarm against granting legal immunity to physicians for assisted suicide based 
on our experiences in the front lines of that system.’47  As Coleman suggests, other end-of-
life decisions, whether they be  non-treatment decisions, or aggressive alleviation of pain, 
may be disproportionately aimed at the vulnerable; however, it important to recognise that 
unlike assisted dying such decisions do not require the patient to make a voluntary request for 
assistance, the cornerstone of any assisted dying legislation.   There is a need for clarity about 
the whole gamut of end-of-life decisions, about the status of pain relief and palliative 
sedation, and about the basis for the distinction between acts and omissions.  The Assisted 
Dying Bill 2013 offers the opportunity for Parliament to consider this area once again, but as 
                                                            
47 D. Coleman “Assisted suicide laws create discriminatory double standard for who gets suicide prevention and 
who gets suicide assistance: Not Dead Yet Responds to Autonomy, Inc.” (2010) 3 Disability and Health Journal 
39, at 49. 
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will be discussed below it fails to set out a sound procedural framework for end-of-life 
decision-making. 
II Comparative reflections upon legislation permitting assisted dying  
A An overview of the European and American Regulatory Models 
The European regulatory model applies to both euthanasia48 and PAS and is based upon 
fulfilment of the due care criteria, followed by reporting to a monitoring commission.  The 
primary due care criteria set out in the European Acts are that: the patient made a voluntary 
and carefully considered request; the patient was suffering unbearably without prospect of 
improvement; the attending doctor informed the patient about his situation and his prospects 
and, together with the patient, concluded that there is no reasonable alternative to assisted 
dying; the attending doctor must have consulted at least one other, independent physician.  A 
key feature of the European regulatory model is the use of a monitoring commission to 
ensure compliance with the legislation and assess the operation of the law in this area; as will 
be discussed below, no similar regulatory body is found in the American model of regulation.  
Moreover, the European model differs from its American counterpart by requiring that the 
individual be suffering unbearably, but not necessarily that the individual be terminally ill, 
and by making provision for anticipatory requests for euthanasia to be made in advance of 
incapacity and for requests by minors. 
By contrast the American model of regulation is limited to PAS and requires that the patient 
be terminally ill, defined as suffering from an ‘incurable and irreversible disease that … will, 
within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six months.’49  The American 
                                                            
48 Throughout this article when reference to the Dutch and Belgian law is made, ‘euthanasia’ will be 
used in the Dutch/Belgian sense, that is in relation to the active termination of an individual’s life at her 
request, categorised as AVE in the Anglo-American literature.  
49 Oregon Death With Dignity Act s.1(12); cf. Washington Death With Dignity Act RCW 70.245.010 (13); cf 
Vermont Patient Choice at End of Life Act  § 5281 (10). 
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Acts do not require that the patient be suffering unbearably, or that euthanasia be a last resort, 
but the remaining due care requirements found in the European model are also found in the 
American legislation (the need for a voluntary, informed request and a second opinion), with 
the addition of a cooling off period applied in all cases. Unlike the European model of 
regulation, no provision is made for the creation of a regulatory body to ensure compliance 
with the Act.  Instead, doctors are required to maintain records detailing compliance and to 
report the assistance to the Health Authority.  The function of the authority is very different 
from that of the European monitoring commission, its primary role being to compile and 
publish an annual statistical report concerning the Act, rather than to monitor compliance 
with the Act and evaluate its operation. A detailed investigation of compliance will only 
occur if a complaint is made to the medical board.  
B The Assisted Dying Bill 2013 
The Bill seeks to authorise healthcare professionals to assist the suicide of terminally ill adult 
patients with capacity who have a clear and settled intention to end their lives (clause 1).  It 
does not provide for reporting, other than by way of death certification, nor does it envisage 
the creation of a monitoring commission, it thus closely resembles the American Acts. The 
Bill was introduced in May 2013 as a Private Members Bill by Lord Falconer, the chair of the 
Commission on Assisted Dying which reported in 2012.50  Given the nature and constitution 
of the commission it is perhaps unsurprising that it concluded that: 
the current legal status of assisted suicide is inadequate and incoherent… [but that] it 
is possible to devise a legal framework  that would set out strictly defined 
                                                            
50 The ‘Commission on Assisted Dying’ was not an independent inquiry of the ilk of the House of Lords Select 
Committee established to consider Lord Joffe’s Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill 2004 (Select 
Committee on the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill  Bill, Volume I: Report HL Paper 86-II (2005)),  nor that 
set up in the aftermath of Bland (n.7).  Instead this was a commission established with private funding from 
Terry Pratchett and Bernard Lewis, both supporters of Dignity in Dying with no government remit.  The 
commission’s credibility was significantly undermined by the fact that a number of key informants, including 
the British Medical Association, the Royal College of General Practitioners, declined to give evidence. 
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circumstances in which terminally  ill people might be assisted to die, supported by 
health and social care professionals, and which would employ robust upfront 
safeguards to prevent inappropriate requests that did not meet the eligibility criteria 
from  going ahead.  
It is suggested that both these conclusions are correct, however it is also argued that this Bill 
fails to establish such a legal framework, leaving the bulk of the substantive and procedural 
safeguards to be determined by regulations and/or codes of practice at a later date.   
1) Qualifying conditions 
a. Terminal illness/unbearable suffering 
One of the key differences between the European and American approaches to assisted dying 
legislation is that the American statutes focus upon terminal illness as a qualifying condition, 
whilst the European legislation imposes the dual requirement that the patient be suffering 
unbearably (a subjective assessment) without prospect of improvement (an objective 
assessment).51  The Assisted Dying Bill 2013 follows the American model so that there is no 
requirement that the patient be suffering at all, provided that the patient is terminally ill, 
clause 1(1), defined as requiring that the patient be diagnosed with an inevitably progressive 
condition and be ‘reasonably expected to die within six months,’ clause 2(1).52  This 
quantitative requirement illustrates the disconnect between the Bill and the (non-US) context 
within which it is intended to operate.  Whilst this qualifying condition is standard within the 
American Acts, it reflects the fact that section 1861(dd) of the Social Security Act limits 
Medicare funding for hospice care to the ‘terminally ill’, defined as those with a prognosis of 
                                                            
51 See Art. 3 §1 Belgian Act, s.2 (1)(b) Dutch Act.  Significantly the Luxemburg Act deviates from the standard 
model by imposing a requirement that in the case of a contemporaneous request the patient must be terminally 
ill as well as suffering unbearably without prospect of improvement (Art. 2(3)); this qualification is not applied 
in the case of an advance request for euthanasia, Art. 4.   
52 Cf. Oregon Death With Dignity Act s.1(12); Washington Death With Dignity Act RCW 70.245.010 (13); cf 
Vermont Patient Choice at End of Life Act  §5281 (10). 
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six months or less.  Such a limitation is inapplicable in the European context, a context of 
universal healthcare provision. Indeed the requirement of a six-month prognosis is 
inconsistent with the GMC’s broader view of when patients are considered to be 
‘approaching the end of life,’ being ‘when they are likely to die within the next twelve 
months.’53   
Moreover, this qualification fails to recognise that prognostication is an art, not a science.  
The legal bright line set out in clause 2(1) simply does not reflect prognostic reality, that 
prognoses are statistical averages where reliability is at its highest in relation to cancer, but 
that as the length of life expectancy extends, the reliability of the prognosis declines.  
Accurate prognosis is even more difficult in the case of degenerative diseases and studies 
demonstrate that doctors are likely to overestimate how long patients will live, rather than 
underestimate remaining life expectancy,54 potentially excluding many people from the ambit 
of the legislation.  Linda Ganzini reported that 25% of Oregon physicians were not confident 
in their ability to determine the requisite six month life expectancy,55  a difficulty that is 
clearly reflected in the Oregon DWDA annual reports.  The reports show that the median 
time from first request to death in Oregon has remained stable at 46-47 days,56 however, 
every year patients live longer than six months, the most extreme case occurring in 2008 
where a patient survived for 1009 days (more than two and a half years) after making the first 
request required under the Act.   
The limitation of assistance to the terminally ill is likely to prove unworkable, in terms of 
diagnosing terminal illness with death likely to occur within six months, but it is also 
incompatible with the motivating factors of compassion, dignity and autonomy, none of 
                                                            
53 GMC Treatment and care towards the end of life: good practice in decision making”, 2010, at para. 2. 
54 W. Hartsell et al, ‘Can physicians accurately predict survival time in patients with metastatic cancer? Analysis 
of RTOG 97-14’ (2008) 11(5) Journal of Palliative Medicine 723. 
55 L. Ganzini et al “Oregon Physicians’ Attitudes About and Experiences With End-of-Life Care Since Passage 
of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act” (2001) 285(18) JAMA 2363, at 2368.   
56 Oregon DWDA Annual Report 2012, at 6. 
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which are dependent upon the patient being terminally ill.  The language used by the 
proponents of the Bill, and reflected in the title of the Oregon statute upon which it is based, 
reflects the fact that the aim of this legislation is to permit the patient to die with dignity.  
However, it is illogical to argue that the autonomy and dignity of the terminally ill would 
justify assisted suicide, but exclude those suffering from degenerative diseases such as motor 
neurone disease, Huntingdon’s and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (‘ALS’) – devastating, 
progressive diseases where the patient will live for much longer than six months, and 
potentially suffer significantly more than someone who is terminally ill.    
It is suggested that the need for effective safeguards does not require access to be restricted to 
the terminally ill, but that rather assistance should be limited to those suffering unbearably, 
without prospect of improvement.  Such cumulative qualifying conditions form an integral 
part of the European model of regulation and were included in both Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bills 2004/5.  Nevertheless, the Assisted Dying Commission concluded that an 
unbearable suffering requirement would be too unclear and subjective for doctors to assess,57 
a conclusion that fails to take account of the evidence to the contrary from our European 
neighbours. 
The concept of unbearable suffering is inherently subjective, as Marianne Dees explains 
‘Unbearable suffering can only be understood in the continuum of the patient’s perspectives 
of the past, the present and expectations of the future.’58  Indeed it is the subjective nature of 
the assessment which supports claims to base assisted dying upon the principle of respect for 
human dignity.  Nevertheless, there is an objective element to the assessment because the 
patient’s view that the suffering is unbearable must, in the words of the Dutch Review 
                                                            
57 Commission on Assisted Dying Report 2012, at 305. 
58 M.K. Dees et al “’Unbearable suffering’: a qualitative study on the perspectives of patients who request 
assistance in dying” (2011) 37  JME 727, at 733. 
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Committees, be palpable to the doctors, 59 whose personal views will affect their assessment 
of what will constitute unbearable suffering justifying euthanasia, many taking a much 
narrower view than the legislature and requiring the patient to be terminally ill.60 As 
researchers conducting the second evaluation of the efficacy and side-effects of the Dutch 
Act found in 2012, 85% of Dutch doctors would consider performing euthanasia, but less 
than 50% would do so in what might be considered the more controversial cases, namely in 
the case of a psychiatric disorder, dementia or  existential suffering.61 
The concept of suffering is much broader than the experience of pain, encompassing psycho-
social and relational distress, and requiring a consideration of the whole person, of how the 
person perceives her situation.62 Thus, as the Dutch Supreme Court held in the Schoonheim 
case, it might take the form of degradation of personal dignity and the loss of the opportunity 
to die with dignity.63   However, the creation of a robust framework will need to distinguish 
between forms of suffering, determining which forms will justify a request for assistance 
without undermining respect for human dignity and life in general.  In the Chabot case, 1994, 
the Dutch Supreme Court recognised that psychiatric suffering could constitute unbearable 
suffering and that the psychiatric nature of the suffering did not preclude a voluntary and 
well-considered request for termination of life, although it stressed the need for extreme 
caution in such cases.64  The Dutch and Belgian Acts both permit euthanasia for physical and 
mental suffering, although the inclusion of psychiatric suffering has proved to be very 
                                                            
59 Regional Euthanasia Review Committees Annual Report 2011, 2012, at 9. Available in English (abridged 
report) at http://www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/Images/RTE.JV2011.ENGELS.DEF_tcm52-33587.PDF; the full 
report in Dutch is available at 
http://www.euthanasiecommissie.nl/Images/Jaarverslag%20RTE%202011_definitief_tcm52-33313.pdf.  All 
references refer to the Dutch version.  Hereinafter RERC Annual Report 2011.   
60 M.K. Dees “Perspectives of decision-making in requests for euthanasia: A qualitative research among 
patients, relatives and treating physicians in the Netherlands” (2013) 27(1) Palliat Med 27, at 34. 
61 A. Van der Heide et al Tweede evaluatie Wet toetsing levensbeëindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding, 
2012 [Second Evaluation of the Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act], available at 
www.zonmw.nl/publicaties, at 13. 
62 For an excellent consideration of the nature of suffering see Eric Cassel The Nature of Suffering and the Goals 
of Medicine, New York: OUP, 2003. 
63 Schoonheim case, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1985, no. 106 (Hoge Raad). 
64 Chabot case, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1994, no. 656 (Supreme Court), at 3155. 
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controversial, not least with psychiatrists, and the statistics show that very few such cases 
result in either euthanasia or PAS every year.  For example, in the Netherlands in 2011 there 
were 13 notifications involving patients with psychiatric problems, representing 0.35% of all 
notifications.65  It is suggested that psychiatric suffering should not be excluded from the 
remit of the legislation, but that it should be subject to a mandatory second opinion by a 
psychiatrist. 
Equally controversial is what has been termed ‘existential suffering’, that is where the patient 
is tired of life.  The Belgian legislation excludes such suffering by requiring that the hopeless 
medical condition and unbearable, unrelievable pain result from a serious and incurable 
accidental or pathological condition, §1.  In the Netherlands the question of whether 
existential suffering could constitute unbearable suffering, formed the focus of the Supreme 
Court’s consideration in the case of Brongersma,66 where the court held that unbearable 
suffering must have a somatic origin, that is it must be caused by either a diagnosable 
physical or psychiatric illness. Whilst this clarification is to be welcomed, it is unlikely to put 
an end to the debate, not least because in cases where the patient is ‘tired of life’ she (like 
Senator Brongersma) is likely to have a number of physical ailments and focus on the 
suffering caused thereby  may well be sufficient to constitute palpable unbearable suffering.   
The Dijkhuis committee set up by the KNMG (the Royal Dutch Medical Association) to 
consider the matter in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling, rejected the narrow view that 
the doctor’s domain is limited to somatic suffering67 a position accepted by the KNMG on the 
basis that existential suffering falls within the medical domain  because non-somatic 
dimensions of suffering may also ‘require alleviation or remediation through palliative 
                                                            
65 RERC Annual Report 2011. 
66 HR 00797/02, 24/12/2002; (2003) 326 BMJ 71. 
67 Op zoek naar normen voor het handelen van artsen bij vragen om hulp bij levensbeëindiging in geval van 
lijden aan het leven, (The search for standards for doctor’s intervention in cases of euthanasia requests for 
existential suffering), Utrecht: KNMG, 2004, at 39 - 43. 
22 
 
care.’68  Thus the second evaluation of the Act (2012) recognised a shift in attitude, so that 
whilst the predominant source of the suffering should be medical in nature, account may also 
be taken of existential suffering.69  There is clearly some scope for flexibility concerning 
what will constitute unbearable suffering without somatic suffering and it is suggested that 
the clarity of the Belgian approach is preferable, namely that legislation should specify that 
suffering be due to a serious and incurable accidental or pathological condition. Subject to 
that proviso, it is suggested that the concept of unbearable suffering is not overly broad as it 
is tempered by the fact that the doctor must consider it palpable.   
In addition to the requirement that the patient be suffering unbearably, both the Dutch and 
Belgian Acts require that suffering to be unrelievable, an objective assessment and thus 
dependent upon medical opinion.  As the Dutch Supreme Court made clear in the Chabot 
case, if a patient rejects a realistic alternative to termination of life that could alleviate her 
suffering, the doctor will be unable to conclude that the suffering is unbearable and without 
any prospect of improvement.70  What constitutes a realistic alternative will be a subjective 
assessment and the extent to which the patient will be required to accept treatment will 
depend upon the burdens such treatment will impose upon the patient and the need for a 
proportional benefit.71  However, it is becoming apparent that palliative sedation may be 
regarded as a realistic alternative to termination of life in alleviating the patient’s suffering.  
This is extremely problematic, as Margaret Battin has argued, palliative sedation: ‘may end 
pain, but it also ends life. It does so in two ways: it immediately ends sentient life and the 
possibility for social interaction, and then, because artificial nutrition and hydration are 
                                                            
68 KNMG 2011 position statement, at 21. 
69 See A. Van der Heide et al Second Evaluation n.61, at 12. 
70 Chabot case n.64, at 3155. 
71See for example Federale Controle- en Evaluatie Commissie Euthanasie Vijfde Verslag Aan de Wetgevende 
Kamers  (2010 - 2011) [Fifth Report], 2012, at 14.  Available at 
http://www.health.belgium.be/internet2Prd/groups/public/@public/@dg1/@acutecare/documents/ie2divers/190
78961.pdf . 
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usually withheld, it also ends biological life.’ 72  This is incompatible with one of the primary 
motivations given for requesting assisted dying, namely to retain control and choose a death 
that reflects the way we have lived our lives.  The sedated patient’s suffering may be relieved, 
but this comes at a high cost, the patient is rendered unconscious, reduced to being an object 
of concern, devoid of those attributes which define a person.  Absent an expressed desire for 
palliative sedation by the patient, it is suggested that this process is inconsistent with respect 
for both autonomy and dignity and therefore that palliative sedation should not be regarded as 
an alternative to assisted dying that could render the patient’s suffering relievable.73 
The Assisted Dying Bill 2013 should be amended to permit assistance in cases where the 
patient is suffering unbearably without prospect of improvement, by its very nature the 
subjectivity of the unbearable suffering requirement complements the promotion of dignity, 
without increasing the scope for abuse. Moreover, it is suggested that rather than restricting 
access to assisted dying by imposing a requirement that the patient be terminally ill, a much 
more effective, and arguably justifiable, restriction would be to accept that whilst unbearable 
suffering can justify assisted dying, it should be subjected to additional safeguards where 
death is not imminent.  This is the approach adopted by the Belgian Act which imposes a 
mandatory cooling-off period and an additional, more rigorous consultation requirement in 
such cases. In practice the degree to which life is shortened in each jurisdiction is small, but 
some people do elect for termination of life when they are not expected to die in the short 
term, for example in Belgium 9% of euthanasia cases concern patients who were not 
expected to die in the near future, largely patients suffering from progressive neurological 
disorders, including Alzheimer’s, Huntington’s and ALS.74  The Bill’s restrictive use of 
‘terminal illness’ as a qualifying condition is nothing more than an artificial restriction upon 
                                                            
72 M. Battin “Terminal Sedation: Pulling the Sheet over Our Eyes” (2008) 38(5) Hastings Center Report 27, at 
27-8. 
73 See also RERC Annual Report 2011, at 16, concluding that if the patient refuses palliative sedation it will not 
be considered a reasonable alternative to euthanasia.  
74 FCCE Fifth Report, n.71, at 8. 
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assisted dying which does not reflect any principled stand point.  It is merely a device 
intended to make the Bill appear more restrictive and thus more palatable, however, the 
illusion of control does not equate with true control.  A more principled approach demands 
that access be provided to those suffering unbearably without prospect of improvement with 
robust safeguards to ensure assisted dying remains a last resort.    
b. The patient must be an adult with capacity, clause 1(2)(c) 75 
Both the attending and consulting doctors must be satisfied that the patient has the requisite 
capacity to make the decision to end her own life (clause 3(3)(b)). Capacity is decision-
specific, that is the greater the import of the decision, the higher the degree of capacity that 
will be required.76  In the case of assisted dying it can be expected that an extremely high 
degree of capacity will be required and in case of doubt the principle of in dubio pro vitae 
will apply.  Every adult is presumed to have capacity (s.1(2) Mental Capacity Act 2005), 
however, the Assisted Dying Commission argued that it is necessary to invert the 
presumption in the case of assisted dying due to the serious nature of the decision.77  It is 
certainly true that requesting assistance in dying is a serious matter, however a refusal of 
treatment, even life-sustaining treatment, will of itself not trigger a capacity assessment and it 
is difficult to see why a request for assisted dying should displace the presumption. The Bill 
fails to specify how capacity will be assessed or make provision for a psychiatric filter, 
                                                            
75 Like the American Acts, the Assisted Dying Bill 2013 restricts access to assistance in dying to adults.  By 
contrast, both the Dutch and the Belgian Acts envisage the possibility of minors requesting assistance in dying, 
although such assistance is rare.  The Dutch Act applies the standard law relating to medical treatment (Art. 450 
(2) Law on Contracts for Medical Treatment (WGBO)) to the euthanasia context, allowing children aged 12 and 
over to request euthanasia with parental consent, or minors of 16 and over to make the decision themselves, 
albeit with parental involvement (s.2(3)(4).) The Belgian law is much narrower; only emancipated minors may 
currently make a valid request (Art. 3§1), although the Belgian Parliament is currently considering an 
amendment to bring the Act into line with the Law on Patients’ Rights which recognises the right of a minor 
capable of a reasonable appreciation of their situation to consent or refuse treatment, Article 12(2).  
Unfortunately the issues involved in permitting minors to request assisted dying are too many and too complex 
to explore in greater depth in this article due to considerations of  length. 
76 In re T  n.11, per Lord Donaldson MR at 113; B n. 12, per Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P, at para. 31; Bland 
n. 6, per Lord Goff at 864. 
77 Commission on Assisted Dying Report 2012, at 308. 
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leaving such matters as ‘assessing whether the person has capacity to make such a decision 
[and] recognising and taking account of the effects of depression or other psychological 
disorders that may impair a person’s decision-making…’ to be set out in a code of practice.78  
It is suggested that given the serious nature of these matters, and the need for a rigorous 
framework, any such provisions should be part of the parent Act.  A request for assistance 
should not act as an automatic trigger for a formal capacity assessment, such an assessment 
only being appropriate where there is disagreement between the consulting and attending 
doctors as to the patient’s capacity.  Moreover, a psychiatric referral is not required to assess 
capacity, but should be mandatory only where a psychological disorder is considered to be 
potentially impairing a person’s decision-making.  
i) Depression 
There is conflicting evidence about the correlation between depression and a request for 
assisted dying,79 although reactive depression is a common response to life-limiting disease.  
Whilst depression will not necessarily render the individual unable to make a valid request, it 
does raise questions about the individual’s capacity that need to be addressed.  For that reason 
the Dutch Regional Review Committees (RRCs) have advised that where the attending doctor 
considers that depression may be affecting the patient’s decisional capacity she should seek 
the advice of a psychiatrist in addition to the statutory consultation requirement80 and the 
Oregon Act provides for a mandatory ‘counselling referral’ to a psychiatrist or psychologist 
in such cases, s.3.   
Requests for assistance are likely to be made in circumstances where the patient’s symptoms 
overlap with indicators of depression including fatigue, insomnia, weightloss and feelings of 
                                                            
78 Cl. 8(1)(a)Assisted Dying Bill 2013.  
79 I. Levene, M. Parker “Prevalence of depression in granted and refused requests for euthanasia and assisted 
suicide: a systematic review” (2011) 37 JME 205. 
80 RERC Annual Report 2011, at 11. 
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hopelessness. However, care should be taken to avoid the psychiatrisisation of assisted dying 
and a psychiatric consultation should not be sought merely to validate the attending doctor’s 
view that the patient has the capacity to make a valid request.  Linda Ganzini found that more 
than three quarters of those requesting PAS in Oregon were not depressed and recommended 
the use of a screening tool such as the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) to 
identify patients who might be suffering from depression and refer those patients on for 
psychiatric evaluation.81   This approach seems eminently sensible, recognising that a 
psychiatric evaluation will not be necessary in every case and therefore should not become an 
undue burden upon the patient’s ability to access assisted dying, or further stigmatise the 
process of requesting assistance. 
ii) Anticipatory requests for assistance in dying 
In common with the American Acts, the Bill makes no provision for the exercise of precedent 
autonomy, unlike the Dutch, Belgian and Luxemburg Acts which provide that a patient can 
execute an advance euthanasia directive, requesting that her life be terminated in specified 
circumstances if she lacks capacity.82  Clearly such a request would differ from the advance 
decisions given effect under the Mental Capacity Act, which limits such decisions to the 
refusal of treatment, but in principle, there is no reason why a specific advance euthanasia 
request, applicable in the circumstances, could not represent a valid request.  However, the 
difficulties associated with determining the conditions in which such requests should operate 
are well demonstrated by the experience of the Benelux countries.  The Belgian and 
Luxemburg Acts restrict advance requests to cases where a serious and incurable accidental 
                                                            
81 L. Ganzini et al “Prevalence of depression and anxiety in patients requesting physicians’ aid in dying: cross 
sectional survey” (2008) 337 BMJ 1682.  For similar findings in relation to the Netherlands see M. Van der Lee 
“Depression, Euthanasia, and Assisted Suicide”, chapter 18, in S.J. Youngner & G.K.Kimsma (eds) Physician-
Assisted Death in Perspective Assessing the Dutch Experience Cambridge: CUP, 2012. 
82 S.2(2) Dutch Act, Art. 4 Belgian Act, Art. 4 Luxemburg Act. 
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or pathological condition has rendered the patient irreversibly unconscious,83 a state where 
the patient would not usually be considered to be suffering.84  By contrast, the Dutch Act 
subjects anticipatory requests to the same requirements as contemporaneous requests, the 
most problematic of which in this context is the requirement that the patient be suffering 
unbearably.  Thus, the Dutch Act has generally been considered to permit euthanasia in cases 
of dementia, for example, but to exclude cases of coma unless the patient is in a state of semi-
consciousness and visibly distressed.85   
Thus there is no consistency in this area, the Belgian approach restricts the operation of 
precedent autonomy to the unconscious patient, the Dutch to those who have sufficient 
consciousness to experience unbearable suffering.  As Buchanan and Brock note, the fact that 
an individual’s interests may be radically and unforeseeably different from those anticipated 
significantly weakens the argument for precedent autonomy.86  Nevertheless, a principled 
approach to protecting both internal and external understandings of dignity is required.  Thus, 
if it is accepted that the internal conception of dignity requires that limits be placed upon the 
eligibility to request assistance in dying, those limits should also be applied to the 
anticipatory decision-making context, requiring, as in the Netherlands, that the patient can be 
said to be suffering unbearably.  Whilst it accepted that this approach will exclude patients in 
a persistent vegetative state or coma, it is suggested that this is consistent with the demands 
of universal dignity and that personal dignity can in such cases be protected by recognising 
the validity of applicable advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment, including ANH.   
                                                            
83 Art. 4 §1; Art. 4(1) Luxemburg Act. 
84 NHS Trust A v M; NHS Trust B v H [2001] Fam. 348, per Dame Butler-Sloss, at 363. 
85 RERC Annual Report 2011, at 15-16.  This is also the view taken by the KNMG in its 2010 guidance relating 
to euthanasia in cases of reduced consciousness which adopts the Glasgow-coma score, recommending that a 
patient scoring below 6 is in a deep coma and therefore cannot be considered to be suffering, KNMG Richtlijn 
euthanasie bij een verlaagd bewustzijn, Utrecht, 2010. 
86A. Buchanan & D. Brock Deciding for others: the ethics of surrogate decisionmaking, CUP, 1990, at 105-6. 
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Anticipatory requests are likely to be of most value, and least controversial in cases of 
degenerative diseases such as motor neurone diseases, where the patient retains 
consciousness, but is progressively debilitated by the condition, losing all ability to 
communicate.  In such cases a clearly applicable anticipatory request for euthanasia,87 setting 
out the point at which assistance should be triggered, should be respected. For example in Re 
AK (medical treatment: consent)88  a motor neurone disease sufferer was able to create a 
valid and applicable directive requiring that ventilation be discontinued two weeks after he 
ceased being able to communicate; it is suggested that a request for euthanasia formulated 
upon the same terms should be equally valid.  The implementation of an anticipatory request 
is likely to be most controversial in the case of dementia where the scope for suffering is 
immense, but where there is considerable potential for doubts concerning revocation and 
arguments that the now severely demented patient (P2) is a very different person to the 
person she was at the time of formulating the advance request (P1) due to the loss of 
psychological continuity.89 Dresser argues that the patient should be treated in accordance 
with her best interests rather than being subjected to the paternalistic views held by her 
former self.90 However, an assessment of the patient’s best interests prioritises the patient’s 
current physical interests rather than recognising her as a person with interests and values that 
transcend dementia. As argued above, dignity requires that individuals be able to make 
choices reflecting their innermost beliefs and values about the circumstances in which they 
                                                            
87 PAS is unlikely to be a viable option in such cases. Despite the fact that Diane Pretty suggested that she 
required assistance in committing suicide, it is difficult to conceive of a manner in which she could be so 
assisted given the extent to which the disease had progressed, rendering her unable to swallow or operate a 
syringe driver.  
88 [2001] 1 FLR 129 
89 D. Parfit Reasons and Persons, OUP, 1986.  For a detailed consideration of this issue see R.S. Dresser 
‘Missing persons: legal perceptions of incompetent patients’ (1994) 46 RULR 609; R.S. Dresser ‘Advance 
Directives, self-determination, and personal identity’ in C. Hackler et al (eds) Advance Directives in Medicine, 
Greenwood Press, 1989; N. Cantor, ‘Discarding Substituted Judgment And Best Interests: Toward A 
Constructive Preference Standard For Dying, ‘Previously Competent Patients Without Advance Instructions’ 
(1996) 48 RULR 1193, at 1210; R. Dworkin n.31; N. Rhoden ‘Litigating life and death’ (1988) 102 Harv LR 
275; A. Maclean ‘Advance directives, future selves and decisionmaking’ (2006) 14 Med LR 291. 
90 N.89. 
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would wish to be treated, these must be the determinative interests that survive incapacity, 
trumping current experiential interests. Engaging in bifurcation of the individual is 
inconsistent with promoting dignity in either guise, rather it is submitted that a unitary 
approach must be taken, that it must be accepted that all lives go through differing phases and 
that each phase, including a demented phase, is simply part of the same life. That being so, 
the principle of dignity requires that an individual’s competent choices made with capacity 
must be respected, and that additional safeguards be put in place to ensure the protection of 
the universal dignity of human life, reflecting the addition need for protection in the case of 
dementia.  Therefore, it is suggested that the advice of the Dutch RRCs be adopted, that in 
dementia cases an independent psychiatrist or geriatrician should be consulted in addition to 
the usual consultation requirement, ensuring that the due care criteria have been met.91 
 
2) The absolute requirement of a voluntary informed request for assisted dying 
The primary safeguard in any legislation that legalises AVE and PAS must be to ensure that 
the termination of life only takes place at the request of the patient and that that request is not 
a coerced choice masquerading as free will.  Thus the Bill, along with each of the 
jurisdictions under consideration require both the attending and consulting doctor to assure 
herself that the patient’s request is voluntary, fully informed, well considered and enduring.  
It is vital that these elements are verifiable and so detailed records of the request, information 
provided and of discussions of alternatives to assisted dying should be kept and should feed 
into the monitoring process.  
a. Physician assisted suicide as an indicator of voluntariness 
                                                            
91 RERC Annual Report 2011, at 12. 
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In line with the recommendation of the Assisted Dying Commission, 92 the Bill would only 
permit PAS, placing it firmly within the American model of regulation. The doctor plays an 
active and necessarily causal role in the patient’s death in both AVE and PAS,93  but PAS is 
generally regarded as less controversial than euthanasia, particularly because it emphasises 
the patient’s individual responsibility and increases the patient’s control of her death.94    
However, the relevance of this distinction is probably overstated, as the Dutch Health 
Council has recognised, ‘The context in which the treatment takes places seems far more 
important than the form assumed by the assistance in a specific case.’95     
The House of Lords Select Committee approved of the preference for PAS set out in the 
ADTI 2004 for the above reasons, but failed to address the evidence of a number of studies 
that have shown that efficacy problems are quite frequently encountered with PAS96 and that 
it may not lead to the ‘gentle and easy’ death desired. For example in 2012 one Oregonian 
recovered consciousness two days after ingesting the drugs, remaining minimally responsive 
until he died six days later of the underlying condition.97 Such problems undoubtedly explain 
the fact that despite the KNMG’s expressed preference for PAS, over 90% of Dutch assisted 
deaths are the result of euthanasia.98  Thus where permissible assistance is restricted to PAS, 
the doctor is placed in the unenviable position of assisting someone to commit suicide by 
                                                            
92 Report of the Assisted Dying Commission, at 318. 
93 D.W. Brock Life & Death (1993) Cambridge: CUP, at 55.   
94 See for example KNMG Vision on Euthanasia, Utrecht, 1995.   
95 Dutch Health Council Euthanasie. Advise inzake euthanasie uitgebracht door de Gezondheidsraad aan de 
Minister en de Staatssecretarie van Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiëne [Euthanasia: Advice concerning 
Euthanasia from the Health Council to the Minister and the Secretary of State for Public and Environmental 
Health] Den Haag, Staatsuitgeverij 1982, at 15.  
96   See for example JH Groenewoud et al “Clinical problems with the performance of euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide in the Netherlands.” (2000) 342 N Engl J Med 551. – arguing that 16% of PAS in the 
Netherlands led to serious complications or did not work.  Complications ranged from technical problems e.g. 
insertion of IV to nausea / vomiting problems and problems with completion, e.g. the patient woke up. 
Similarly, in 2012, the Belgian FCCE reported that of the 12 cases of assisted suicide (less than 1% of the 
assisted dying cases for the period) eight patients died without further intervention, but that the doctor 
intervened to give a muscle relaxant in the remaining four cases, suggesting a failure rate of one in three in 
assisted suicide cases, FCCE Fifth Report, n.71, at 17. 
97 Oregon DWDA Annual Report 2012, at 2. 
98 In 2010 only 0.1% of all deaths in the Netherlands were the result of PAS, 2.8% resulted from AVE.  
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providing access to the lethal drugs, but prevented from intervening to ensure the patient dies 
quickly and without further suffering when complications arise.  Such cases will be 
distressing for all concerned and there appears to be no principled reason for prohibiting 
doctors from intervening in such cases.  
Moreover, it may be very difficult to accurately draw the line between euthanasia and PAS.  
Whilst the American model can be characterised as a licensing scheme whereby doctors are 
permitted to prescribe lethal drugs to qualifying patients, the Assisted Dying Bill 2013 
appears to envisage a much greater degree of participation by the assisting healthcare 
professional.  Thus assistance may be rendered in three ways, the assisting healthcare 
professional may ‘prepare [the] medicine for self-administration …, prepare a medical 
device which will enable [the] person to self-administer the medicine; and assist that person 
to ingest or otherwise self-administer the medicine,’ but ‘the decision to self-administer the 
medicine and the final act of doing so must be taken by the person for whom the medicine 
has been prescribed,’ clause 4(4). Thus, the healthcare professional may mix the medicine 
and may set up a device such as a syringe driver, but it is not entirely clear what the third 
option is intended to cover - might it perhaps just mean holding a glass so that the individual 
can drink through a straw?  Or might it mean pouring the mixture into the person’s mouth, 
leaving her to swallow it? At what point will the doctor have crossed the Rubicon into the 
realm of AVE? The dividing line between PAS and AVE is very difficult to draw, but the 
third method appears to be nothing more than a catch-all clause, designed to permit whatever 
assistance is required.  Such poorly formulated clauses, without additional information in the 
explanatory notes, do not inspire much confidence in the Bill’s ability to set effective 
safeguards upon the assisting dying and require urgent clarification. 
Arguably the fact that the Assisted Dying Bill 2013 is restricted to assisted suicide is a 
pragmatic decision designed to make the Bill more likely to be passed.  Certainly the 
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American experience in the lead up to the enactment of the Oregon Act suggests that 
restricting legislation to PAS and referring to ‘death with dignity’ rather than assisted suicide 
makes the Bill much more palatable to voters.99  Similarly, it could be suggested that 
reference to ‘assisted dying,’ rather than PAS, might make the Bill more acceptable to 
doctors, framing the doctor’s role as helping to bring the dying phase to an end, rather than 
ending life. In a systematic review of the literature Ruaidhri McCormack found that the 
majority of UK doctors do not support either AVE or PAS,100 whilst Clive Seale found that 
although 34% of doctors supported AVE if the patient were in pain and terminally ill, that 
figure rose to 35.2% supporting PAS in the same circumstances,101 suggesting that by 
limiting the role of the physician to that of prescriber, the Bill will be slightly more palatable 
to the medical profession. Nevertheless it is clear that the degree of support that was so 
instrumental in forming the euthanasia policy in the Netherlands is lacking within the British 
medical profession.102    PAS enables the doctor’s involvement to be viewed as a partnership 
with the patient rather than as being the agent of death and it affirms the voluntariness of the 
patient’s request, but whilst it would be legitimate for the Bill to prefer PAS, it is suggested 
that limiting assistance to PAS in all cases is discriminatory (excluding those who are 
physically unable to ingest the medication), is liable to leave the patient in a much worse 
position if problems occur, and lacks a principled basis.   
                                                            
99 R.P. Jones Liberalism’s Troubled Search for Equality: Religion and Cultural Bias in the Oregon Physician-
Assisted Suicide Debates, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007, citing D. Humphrey and M. 
Clement Freedom to Die: People, Politics, and the Right-to-Die Movement, New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 
2000 at 246. 
100 R. McCormack et al “Attitudes of UK doctors towards euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide: A 
systematic literature review” (2012) 26(1) Palliat Med 23. 
101 C. Seale “Legalisation of euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide: survey of doctors' attitudes” (2009) 23 
Palliat Med 205. 
102 See findings reported by C. Seale n.101, R. McCormack n.100, W. Lee et al “Survey of doctors' opinions of 
the legalisation of physician assisted suicide” (2009) 10(2) BMC Medical Ethics doi:10.1186/1472-6939-10-2. 
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b) The role of the doctor in ensuring the request is voluntary, fully informed, well-
considered and enduring. 103 
Each of the jurisdictions requires the attending doctor to be satisfied that the patient’s request 
is voluntary, fully informed, well-considered and enduring.  However, the procedural 
safeguards designed to ensure this was the case vary due to the way in which compliance is 
monitored in the European model and largely assumed in the American model of regulation.  
Generally the European regulatory schemes rely upon the doctor developing a dialogue with 
her patient, and documenting that dialogue detailing the quality and nature of the request to 
demonstrate compliance with the due care criteria.  The reports are scrutinised by monitoring 
committees, to ensure that doctors were diligent in satisfying themselves that the patient’s 
request meets the criteria and in complying with all the other due care criteria.  By contrast 
the American model of regulation requires detailed records to be kept, noting the date of the 
first and second request for example, but then has what can only be described as a very light-
touch monitoring mechanism which assumes, rather than monitors compliance.   
The Assisted Dying Bill 2013 again follows the American model by requiring a witnessed 
written request (regrettably no provision is made for anyone unable to complete a written 
request),104 followed by a cooling off period of 14 days,105 reduced to 6 days if the attending 
and consulting doctors believe the patient will die within one month.106  Prior to the 
assistance being given the patient must confirm that she has not revoked her declaration, 
effectively restating it. The Bill requires the patient’s request to be made on an ‘informed 
                                                            
103 These elements have proved unproblematic in each jurisdiction and thus are only briefly considered due to 
space constraints. For a more detailed consideration of each element see S. Halliday “Regulating AVE: what can 
England & Wales learn from Belgium and the Netherlands?” in Garwood-Gowers et al (eds) Contemporary 
Issues in Health Law and Ethics, Elsevier Science Ltd, 2005, chapter 14; and J. Griffiths et al Euthanasia and 
Law in Europe, Oxford: Hart, 2008 
104 Cl. 3 (1)(a) Assisted Dying Bill 2013. 
105 Cl. 4(2)(d) Assisted Dying Bill 2013. 
106 Cl. 4(3) Assisted Dying Bill 2013. 
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basis,’107 but leaves the question of what information is required to be determined by the 
Secretary of State in a code of practice.108  Such an approach is inconsistent with the desire to 
establish ‘robust upfront safeguards’, particularly as the Bill appears to envisage an American 
style light-touch monitoring of compliance, discussed below.   
c) The role of palliative and social care filters 
Each of the jurisdictions requires the patient’s request to be informed, indeed without such 
information the patient will be in no position to make the requisite well-considered request. 
At a very minimum both the attending and consulting doctors should ensure that the patient 
has a clear understanding of her diagnosis and prognosis and what the assistance will entail, 
but this is left implicit in the Assisted Dying Bill 2013.  However the Bill does stress the need 
for the two doctors to ‘be satisfied that the [patient] … has been fully informed of the 
palliative, hospice and other care which is available’ to her. This provision does not require 
the patient to accept palliative care, nor does it guarantee her all the palliative care that might 
benefit her, but it does require a discussion of the care available to her.   
This is not a palliative care filter, the requirement could conceivably be met via an 
information leaflet, but if the required information is to serve any real purpose it needs to be 
provided by a specialist in palliative care (either a doctor or nurse) as part of an ongoing 
dialogue about choices and care available to the individual at the end-of-life, rather than 
being regarded as a checkbox on the route to assisted dying.  None of the Acts imposes a 
palliative care filter, although as Guenter Lewy argues, in the majority of cases in Belgium 
there is a de facto palliative care filter because a requirement that a palliative care 
consultation take place is part of the guidelines for clinical practice adopted by the majority 
of institutions within Caritas Flanders, an organisation representing about 65% of hospitals 
                                                            
107 Cl. 3 Assisted Dying Bill 2013. 
108 Cl. 9 Assisted Dying Bill 2013. 
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and 40% of nursing homes in Flanders.109  Moreover, evidence from each of the jurisdictions 
suggests that since assisted dying was legalised (although not necessarily because of that 
fact), doctors have become more knowledgeable about palliative care and of the part it plays 
in taking a more holistic approach to caring for the dying.110  Indeed, evidence from both 
European and America shows that strengths in palliative care can co-exist with assisted 
dying, that they should be regarded as complementary to one another, rather than as 
alternatives.111  
Throughout this article I have argued that dignity demands that individuals are permitted to 
make their own choices about how they die, including being able to request assistance.  
However, choice is meaningless if the individual is requesting assistance because she is not 
informed of, or cannot access palliative or social care, that would raise her quality of life to 
that which she would consider acceptable. Although the UK is renowned for its contribution 
to the palliative care field, provision is patchy and so access can be difficult in some areas, it 
also still very much tailored towards the cancer patient.  Progress is being made on both these 
fronts as part of the Government’s end-of-life strategy, but further investment will be needed 
to ensure that demand can be met. Similarly, the discussion of existential suffering illustrates 
the need for a multi-agency approach to requests for assistance in dying, particularly in cases 
where the patient is not expected to die within the short term.  Thus a social care filter is also 
required, whereby social workers should be involved to consider whether any services could 
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be provided to relieve the patient’s suffering, improving her quality of life. It is suggested 
that were any form of assisted dying to be introduced, the Act should be accompanied by a 
palliative care Act as in Belgium and Luxemburg and the necessary investment, guaranteeing 
patients access to palliative care.  Moreover, a similar investment will need to be made in the 
social care field, a field that has much to offer in the context of empowering individuals and 
improving their quality of life.   
3. The independent consultation requirement 
Each of the jurisdictions incorporates a form of peer-review via a consultation requirement. 
This is an extremely important quality assurance mechanism, requiring the consultant to 
confirm the attending doctor’s medical opinion and that the patient’s request satisfies the 
validity criteria.  This requirement provides the only form of external review that takes place 
prior to the assistance in dying and a measure of importance of this requirement can be seen 
in the stringency with which the Dutch review committees have applied this requirement, 
with failure to comply with the requirement being one of the most common reasons for a 
finding that the doctor has not acted with due care and the case being referred to the 
prosecutorial authorities and/or the medical inspectorate.  
If the consultation requirement is to be an effective safeguard and more than a mere rubber 
stamping exercise the consultant must be truly independent, independent of both the 
attending doctor and the patient. However, in the Assisted Dying Bill 2013independence is 
only defined in relation to the attending doctor, not the patient, clause 3(1)(b)(ii). This is 
clearly a shortcoming and rather surprising given that the Assisted Dying Commission did 
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recognise the need for the consulting doctor to have no pre-existing professional relationship 
with the patient.112  
Some guidance concerning how independence might be ensured can be gained from the way 
in which the requirement has been interpreted by the Dutch and Belgian monitoring 
commissions. They have stressed that the doctor must not belong to the same practice as the 
attending doctor, must not have an ongoing professional relationship with her and must not 
be related, or have a friendship with her; regular cooperation with the same consultant is 
likely to raise questions about the independence of that consultant.113 With regards to the 
patient the committees have confirmed that the consultant must not have treated the patient in 
the past, or currently be responsible for the patient’s care, she must also not be related to the 
patient or a personal friend. 
If the peer review is to operate effectively the consulting doctor must be at least competent as 
to the pathology concerned, but it would clearly be a more effective safeguard if the 
consultant were required to be a specialist in the given area. Of all the jurisdictions under 
consideration, such a requirement is only found in the Belgian Act, and then only in the case 
of a patient who is not expected to die within the short term. The Belgian Act adopts a dual 
consultation requirement in such cases, requiring that the second consultant be either a 
specialist in the patient’s pathology, or a psychiatrist, Article 3 §3(1). Additional lessons can 
be learnt from the context in which assisted dying operated in the Netherlands and Belgium.  
In both jurisdictions a network of euthanasia consultants has been created,the SCEN network 
in the Netherlands and the LEIF network in Flanders.114 Members of these networks are 
specially trained to provide euthanasia consultations.  The Dutch Review Committees have 
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consistently recommended the use of a SCEN consultant, emphasising the high quality of the 
consultation provided and the view taken by the KNMG is that only SCEN consultants 
should be used.   The professionalisation of the consultation process has much to recommend 
it – it should ensure a high quality consultation, functioning not only as a means of 
confirming the factors above, but also operating as a form of a priori review. The 
professionalisation of the consultation process has much to recommend it – it should ensure 
the availability of highly trained, experienced consultants throughout the country, experts 
who are able to offer advice, having a thorough knowledge of the statutory requirements and 
who can also offer support to the attending doctor. It is suggested that provision for a similar 
specialist panel should be established under the auspices of the Assisted Dying Bill 2013, 
with provision for state funding. It could work in a similar manner to the second opinion 
appointed doctors scheme administered by the Care Quality Commission to provide second 
opinions under the Mental Health Act 1983, and the panel of Independent Assessors trained 
and accredited by the Human Tissue Authority to assess potential donations of some living 
organ transplants under the Human Tissue Act. Moreover, it is suggested that the practice of 
‘assisted dying’ consultation be restricted to NHS practitioners, to avoid the possibility of 
private practice developing to provide second opinions.115 
In addition to consulting another doctor, it is suggested that the Bill should be amended to 
incorporate a duty to consult other members of the healthcare team and together with a 
recommendation to consult the patient’s family, as required in Belgium and recommended in 
the Netherlands.116 In the case of other members of the healthcare team, often nurses and 
social workers have no voice in discussions about assisted dying, although both, particularly 
nurses in a residential or hospital setting, are likely to know the patient very well and may 
well be able to elucidate the motivations for the patient’s request, enabling a better 
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assessment of its voluntariness and durability. Similarly, in the case of family members, 
provided that the patient consents to their involvement, it is likely that they will be able to 
give further information relevant to assessing the patient’s request and to provide valuable 
support to the patient. 
  4. The Reporting requirement 
The reporting requirement is a central feature of the European model of regulation – it is a 
key requirement that justifies the doctor’s actions and failure to report will render the doctor 
liable to prosecution. The report forms the basis of the procedural review that follows 
assistance in dying in each of the European jurisdictions. However, whilst the Assisted Dying 
Commission envisaged reporting via a death certificate and to a national monitoring 
commission,117 the Bill only requires reporting via a death certificate and makes no provision 
for a monitoring commission. Thus the Bill requires even less accountability than the Oregon 
legislation which provides for both the attending doctor and the dispensing pharmacist 
reporting to the Oregon Department of Health Services, s.3.11.  It will be recalled that the 
Commission on Assisted Dying concluded that robust upfront safeguards would prevent 
inappropriate requests from going ahead, however, it is suggested that there is little point in 
creating robust upfront safeguards if no accountability mechanisms are to be established to 
ensure those safeguards are not being circumvented.  Thus, the key failing of the Assisted 
Dying Bill 2013 may be seen to be its failure to establish a robust reporting procedure, 
enabling compliance monitoring by an independent commission. 
 
5. The need for a commission to monitor compliance and evaluate the law  
                                                            
117 Assisted Dying Commission Report, 2012, at 319. 
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The Assisted Dying Bill 2013, like its American counterparts, makes no provision for a 
monitoring commission to review compliance with the Act. For example, the Oregon Act 
does not require an investigation of every case reported to the monitoring authority, the 
Oregon Department of Health Services, merely requiring the ODHS to review a sample of 
records pursuant to the Act and  the maintenance of detailed records by the attending doctor, 
s.3.09. If the ODHS suspects that a doctor has not complied with the Act it will refer the 
matter to the Oregon Medical Board. In 2012 no referrals were made, but previous referrals 
have mainly concerned a failure to file documentation in a timely manner, or problems with 
the patient’s written request, for example that the witness and patient did not sign the 
declaration at the same time as the patient. There is no independent commission in Oregon to 
evaluate the way in which the Act operates, or to advise on good practice, although guidance 
is issued by the Task Force to Improve the Care of Terminally-Ill Oregonians in The Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act: A Guidebook for Health Care Professionals,118 to which members of 
the ODHS contribute. 
The Assisted Dying Bill 2013 provides that the Chief Medical Officers shall monitor the 
operation of the Act, including compliance with it and any codes of practice made under it,119 
but in the absence of a detailed reporting procedure there seems little scope for review. The 
only reporting requirements set out in the Bill relate to the recording of the death as an 
‘assisted death’ on the death certificate.120 Whilst such certification will allow the collection 
of statistics relating to the number of people assisted, the underlying terminal disease, age and 
gender, it is difficult to see how a death certificate will enable effective monitoring of assisted 
dying. In fact the only review of the attending doctor’s decision-making and conduct forseen 
by the Bill appears to be the independent consultant. As I have discussed above, SCEN-style 
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consultants may provide an effective a priori control mechanism,121 however it seems 
unlikely that a sufficiently high level of oversight could be expected in a country where there 
are no experienced consultants in assisted dying, where there is no case law and as yet no 
professional guidance. Monitoring compliance with assisted dying is not a case where a ‘light 
touch’ approach should be adopted and this represents a key failing in the Bill. 
It is suggested that the European model of establishing an independent multi-disciplinary 
monitoring commission/committees has much to recommend it, rather than delegating 
compliance monitoring to a government department, be it the Oregon Department of Health 
Services or the Department of Health. The review committees established by the Benelux 
countries are interdisciplinary and independent of the executive, they consider each case of 
assisted dying in detail and report to their respective Parliaments annually (in the 
Netherlands) or biennially (in Belgium and Luxemburg). The fact that the European model 
emphasises independent review agencies, separate from the state, underlines the fact that the 
review is separate from the criminal process.  As Maurice Adams and Heleen Weyers have 
stressed, ‘What would previously have been an exclusively criminal assessment has now 
developed into a professionally and socially oriented assessment with the criminal law 
present only in the background.’122  It is designed not only to ensure that doctors have 
complied with the law (cases of non-compliance are forwarded to the prosecution 
authorities), but also to gain an understanding of the way in which the law is operating on the 
ground, providing valuable feedback to individual doctors (in the case of problems), to the 
medical profession and general public (through information brochures designed to explain 
how the Acts operate) and to government through the reports evaluating the operation of the 
law.  
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The Dutch and Belgian committees approach monitoring compliance in a different way, but 
this article will concentrate upon the Dutch approach, recommending that it offers the best 
example of how a monitoring commission in England and Wales might monitor compliance, 
but also play an role in establishing good practice and evaluating the Act’s operation.123  
The Dutch report forms are very detailed, asking pertinent questions designed to allow the 
doctor to fully explain how she met the due care criteria and so allowing a high degree of 
scrutiny of the decision-making that led up to the decision to assist the patient to die. This 
allows the Dutch committees to give individual feedback to doctors, regardless of whether the 
due care criteria have been satisfied.  The fact that the reports are so elaborate and thus time-
consuming for the doctors to fill in, does increase the risk that doctors’ willingness to report 
might be reduced, or that doctors might be more likely to withhold treatment or use palliative 
sedation instead of euthanasia to avoid the bureaucracy involved in reporting a termination of 
life. However, the information reported feeds into the Dutch annual reports which are 
informative and enable the commissions to develop and encourage good practice by 
publishing a number of case reports as part of the annual report, demonstrating examples of 
good practice and highlighting problem areas. Moreover, the annual reports create a 
significant degree of transparency in terms of how the committees operate and the criteria 
they apply in determining whether or not the doctor has complied with the due care criteria. 
The reports produced by the OHSD and its Washington counterpart are of a very different 
nature to those produced by the European commissions, reflecting their different function and 
makeup. The American reports are drafted and issued by government agencies, rather than 
committees created specifically to monitor PAS. They are also much more limited in nature 
than their European counterparts, primarily reporting epidemiological data, and thus afford 
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no transparency, no opportunity to promote good practice, or even to identify whether the 
operation of the Act could be improved. 
The Assisted Dying Bill’s lack of provision for the establishment of a monitoring 
commission is particularly surprising given that the Assisted Dying Commission set out 
detailed plans for the functions to be performed by the monitoring commission – namely to 
monitor compliance, to publish information to inform and develop professional practice, to 
collect and publish national data and an annual report to Parliament and to encourage (and 
potentially fund) research on the process and consequences of introducing an assisted dying 
framework.124 The failure of the Bill to provide for the creation of such an agency, with the 
obligation to produce annual reports similar to those produced by the Dutch RRCs is to be 
regretted and should be reviewed, particularly as it is suggested that the annual reports issued 
by the Dutch committees are an extremely important educational resource and play a great 
role in promoting good practice.  Absent such an independent commission in England and 
Wales, the collection of statistics envisaged by the Bill is no more than an exercise in 
quantitative data collection, with means to assess the benefits and shortcomings of the Act 
and the context within which it operates, or indeed to improve the provision of end of life 
care.    
III Concluding Remarks 
Any legislation designed to legalise assisted dying must establish the robust regulatory 
framework needed to ensure the protection of patients, but that requires the checks and 
balances contained in that legislation to be more than mere slogans of accountability, they 
must provide real accountability. The safeguards set out in the Assisted Dying Bill 2013 are 
reminiscent of what Michael Power terms ‘ritualized practices of verification whose technical 
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efficacy is less significant than their role in the production of … legitimacy.’125 The strong 
upfront safeguards referred to by the Assisted Dying Commission cannot be reduced to the 
need to keep detailed records, where compliance is reduced to ticking off items on a 
checklist.  Instead, the actors in the regulatory scheme, the attending and consulting doctors 
and an independent review commission charged with ensuring compliance, must seek to 
ensure that the strict confines of the law are respected, whilst not making access to assistance 
so burdensome as to be illusionary. As Karen Yeung argues, policy makers should facilitate 
reasoned deliberation by those involved in the process,126 in the present context this requires 
that all involved in the process, from the health care professionals involved, to the review 
committee charged with monitoring compliance, should seek to ensure that the substance of 
the legislation is given effect, not merely the form. A prime example of a body exceeding the 
rituals of verification is provided by the working methods and reporting style adopted by the 
Dutch RRCs who go beyond merely verifying compliance with the law, to play an educative 
role and promote good practice.  As argued above, the role of the RRCs, and the manner in 
which they fulfil that role, are a key example of good practice that can usefully inform the 
policy debate in England and Wales. 
Like the Oregon Death with Dignity Act upon which it is modelled, the Assisted Dying Bill 
2013 effectively licences doctors to prescribe lethal medication in certain circumstances. It 
does not create a context within which the practice of assisted dying can be evaluated, or 
compliance monitored.  In so doing it fails to take account of the wealth of good practice that 
exists within Europe, adopting a very pragmatic stance, artificially limiting its scope to apply 
to only the terminally ill and permitting only PAS. Both limitations are clearly attempts to 
assuage fears that legalisation may lead to abuse, but they disproportionally restrict the scope 
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of the Bill, excluding many who would wish to seek assistance, who will be left to seek that 
assistance outside the regulatory scheme.  Moreover, the promotion of universal human 
dignity indicates a need for confidence in the reporting and evaluation schemes put in place. 
It demands some way of holding doctors to account as they exercise the function of 
gatekeeper to assisted dying (ultimately the patient’s choice is subject to a doctor being 
willing to assist her to die), and also a means of developing good practice and evaluating the 
operation of the legislative framework and the context within which it operates.  In its current 
form the Bill provides  none of these essential elements of a scheme designed to promote the 
dignity of the individual, whilst concurrently respecting the dignity of human life in general 
by effectively safeguarding the exercise of individual choice from abuse.  
Whilst it is undoubtedly true that legalising assisted dying brings with it the potential for 
abuse, that potential already exists, as Emily Jackson argues, ‘The argument that legalised 
assisted dying would represent a unique opportunity to mistreat the vulnerable is clearly 
misplaced.’127 Individuals belonging to vulnerable groups are already disproportionately 
affected by paternalistic decision-making; the current legal context of end-of-life decision-
making is neither ethically, nor intellectually consistent; and fears concerning the much 
criticised Liverpool Care Pathway128 clearly demonstrate that there is a need for greater 
openness and understanding about choices available at the end-of-life, both in terms of what 
those choices are and who can make them.  Moreover, as Clive Seale demonstrated, assisted 
dying is taking place,129 but it takes place in an unregulated manner, with no supervision, no 
second opinions and no accountability  As Ronald Dworkin argued, the slippery slope 
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argument ‘Loses its bite once we understand that legalising no euthanasia is itself harmful to 
many people, then we realise that doing our best to draw and maintain a defensible line, 
acknowledging and trying to guard against the risk that others will draw the lines differently 
in the future, is better than abandoning those people altogether.’130  
It is clear that the absolute prohibition of assisted dying does not equate with legal control, 
but legalisation may bring wider benefits.  For example, even if assistance were legally 
available, the evidence from Europe and America suggests that the take-up rate would be 
low, but the availability of assisted dying encourages greater openness and dialogue 
regarding end-of-life planning..  As Frances Norwood explains in her analysis of the Dutch 
experience, ‘in practice Dutch euthanasia is more often a discussion than it is a life-ending act 
- a discussion grounded in a cultural discourse that shapes how Dutch people come to think, 
feel and practice the end of life.’131  
In summary, it is suggested that the time is certainly ripe for consideration of assisted dying, 
but for all the reasons given above, the Assisted Dying Bill 2013 needs significant 
amendment if it is to provide a robust framework within which assisted dying is to be 
available, promoting dignity at both the individual and community levels.  A willingness to 
learn from the experience of our European neighbours and to site the provision of assistance 
in dying within the general context of end-of-life care is indicated in order to truly promote 
dignity and to respect and safeguard the value of all lives. 
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